史林

参考文献

(1)关于“琉球”和“冲绳”的使用。美国政府在1945年以前的文献均采用的是Liuqiu一词,1945年12月起改用Ryukyu,该概念称谓包括奄美大岛在内的整个西南群岛地域。美国占领该群岛期间,其机构和正式文件都是使用的是“Ryukyu”,相关外交档案大部分使用的也是“Ryukyu”一词。冲绳,英文为Okinawa,1879年“琉球处分”以后,日本在琉球群岛设置冲绳县,因此日本方面主要使用“冲绳”一词。鉴于此,本文使用“琉球”一词,文中引用部分按照原文处理。

(2)相关期刊有:Leonard Weiss,“US Military Government on Okinawa,”Far Eastern Survey,Vol.15,no.15(July 1946),pp.234-238.Daniel D.Karasik,“Okinawa:a Problem in Administration and Reconstruction,”The Far Eastern Quarterly,Vol.7,no.3(May,1948),pp.254-267.Ralph J.D.Braibant,i“The Outlook of Ryukyus,”Far Eastern Survey,Vol.22,no.7,(June,1953),pp.73-78.Ralph J.D.Braibant,i“The Ryukyu Islands:Pawn of the Pacific,”The American Political Science Review,Vol.48.no.4(Dec.,1954).pp.972-998.Joseph W.Ballantine,“The Future of the Ryukyus,”Foreign Affairs,Vol.31,no.4,(Jul.,1953),pp.663-674。

(1)比较重要的专著有:Akio Watanabe,The Okinawa Problem:A Chapter in Japan-U.S.Relations,Carlton,Victoria:Melbouren University Press,1970.Theodore R.McE lroy,Okinawan Reversion:A Historical Perspective,A research Study Submitted to the Faculty of Air University,Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama,1970.Delano R.Bryan,Okinawa Reversion and the Pacific Line of Defense,Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama,April 1973.比较重要的博士论文有:Johannes A.Binnendijk,“The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion:Case Study of a Political Process,”Ph.D Dissertation from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,1972.Herbert A Kamp,f“The United States and O-kinawa:A Dependency Relationship,”Ph.D Dissertation from The City University of New York,1972.Walter A.Guntharp,“U.S.foreign policy and the reversion of Okinawa to Japan,”Ph.D Dissertation from the George Washington University,1973.Frederick Lambert Shiels,“The American experience in Okinawa:a case study for foreign policy and decision-making theory,”Ph.D Dissertation from Cornell University,1977.Albert Seiga,l“United States Policy toward Okinawa,1945-1972:A Study in Organizational Interaction in Policy-making,”Ph.D Dissertation from West Virginia University,1978.

(2)Neal A.Marco,t“The Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process:A Case Study,Okinawa Reversion,”Ph.D Dissertation from Georgetown University,1981.Richard Gordon Martin,“The Okinawa factor in U.S.-Japanese post-World war II relations,”Ph.D Dissertation from the University of Georgia,1982.Nakachi Kiyosh,i“Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan relations:the reversion movement,political,economic and strategic issues,1945-1972,”Ph.D Dissertation from Northern Arizona University,1986.

(3)1995年9月4日,三名驻日美军士兵绑架并强暴了一名12岁的琉球少女,在当地引发了大规模的反美抗议活动,10月21日,琉球抗议人数达到85 000人。

(4)代表性专著有:Nicholas Evan Sarantakes,Keystone:The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations,Texas A&M University Press,2000.Kensei Yoshida,Democracy Betrayed:Okinawa Under U.S.Occupation,Washington:Center for East Asian Studies Western Washington,2001.John Swenson-Wright,Unequal Allies?United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan,1945-1960,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2005.Arnold G.Fisch,Jr.,Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands1945-1950,Washington,D.C.:Center of Military History United States Army,1998.Robert D.Eldridge,The Origins of Bilateral Okinawa Problem:Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations1,942-1952,New York&London:Garland Publishing,Inc,2001.David John Obermiller,The United States military occupation of Okinawa:Politicizing and Contesting Okinawan identity,1945-1955,Ph.D Dissertation from The University of Iowa,2006.

(5)Wakaizumi Kei,The Best Course Available:A personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations,ed.by John Swenson-Wright,Hawaii:University of Hawaii Press,2002.若泉敬作为佐藤荣作的密使参与了相关秘密会谈,并将会谈始末整理成书于1994年在日本出版,英文版于2002年出版。

(6)刘少东:《日美冲绳问题起源研究(1942-1952)》,世界知识出版社2011年版;《二战前后的冲绳问题及中日美关系研究》,人民出版社2015年版。陈静静:《美日同盟的出现与冲绳问题的产生》,《东北亚论坛》2011年第1期;陈静静、薛伟:《战后美国对琉球政策的争论与其国际战略的转变(1945-1951)》,《日本研究》2017年第2期;李薇:《冲绳问题的复杂因素及其本质》,《日本学刊》2010年第5期;孔晨旭:《战后美国对冲绳长期驻军政策的形成》,《历史教学问题》2011年第4期;安成日、李金波:《试论二战后美国托管冲绳政策的形成(上)》,《北华大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第6期;《试论二战后美国托管冲绳政策的形成(下)》,《北华大学学报(社会科学版)》2012年第1期。安成日、李金波:《试论二战后日本在领土处理问题上的态度与美国托管冲绳》(上),《大连大学学报》2013年第1期;《试论二战后日本在领土处理问题上的态度与美国托管冲绳》(下),《大连大学学报》2013年第5期。

(1)陈静静,姜磊:《美日移交琉球行政权谈判中关于核问题的交涉始末》,《美国研究》2017年第4期。陈波:《冲绳返还与美国在西太平洋的核部署》,《国际观察》2010年第3期;《日美同盟与冷战前美国在日本本土及琉球群岛的核部署》,《日本学刊》2010年第4期;《日美再度博弈冲绳》,《太平洋学报》2010年第10期。

(2)黄大慧、赵罗希:《战后冲绳处置与钓鱼岛争端---美国对冲绳与钓鱼岛问题的战略考量》,《东北亚论坛》2015年第2期;陈海懿:《美国的琉球政策与钓鱼岛问题再研究---以CIA文献为中心》,《东北亚论坛》2016年第6期。另,笔者还有一篇文章从美国应对常规外交问题的模式的角度对琉球问题进行分析。见陈静静:《美国应对常规外交问题的模式》,《美国研究》2014年第1期。崔丕《冷战时期美日关系史研究》(中央编译出版社2013年版)第3章和第7章涉及美国对琉球政策;另见崔丕主编《冷战时期美国对外政策史探微》,中华书局2002年版;《美日返还冲绳施政权谈判中的核密约问题考》,《上海交通大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2014年第4期。

(3)笔者的《战后美国对琉球政策的争论与其国际战略的转变(1945-1951)》一文有较多篇幅涉及到1945-1951年中国因素对美国琉球政策的影响,对该时间段不再详述。参见陈静静、薛伟:《战后美国对琉球政策的争论与其国际战略的转变(1945-1951)》,《日本研究》2017年第2期。

(4)迈克尔·谢勒:《二十世纪的美国与中国》,徐泽荣译,生活·读书·新知三联书店1985年,第96-98页。

(5)1945年11月上旬,他们要求国务院通过外交途径获得的军事基地不包括琉球群岛。参见SWACC 38/25,“Over-all Examinations of U.S.Requirements for Military Bases and Rights,”FRUS,1946,Vol.1,pp.1112-1117.1946年6月,参谋长联席会议将一份修改后的备忘录交给国务院,该备忘录列举了30个地方,还是没有提到琉球。参见SWACC 38/35,“Memorandum by Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-war-Navy Coordinating Committee,”June 5,1946,FRUS,1946,Vol.1,pp.1174-1177.

(1)SWNCC 38/45,“Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-war-Navy Coordinating Committee,”September 9,1946,FRUS,1946,Vol.1,pp.766-767.

(2)SWNCC 59/1,“Policy Concerning Trusteeship and other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan,”http://nmhcdigitalarchive.org/fromT heW hiteHouse/01Truman/1946/0624%20Reid.pdf,2017年3月1日。

(3)Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Sherman to Kennan,September 24,1947,Box 29a,PPS Records,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(4)Papers of Mathew Connelly,Box 1,Harry S.Truman Library,Independence,MO.

(5)Conversion between General of Army MacA rthur and Mr.George F.Kennan,”5 March 1948,in Kennan,“Recommendations with respect to U.S.Policy Toward Japan,”25 March 1947,FRUS,1948,Vol.6,p.701.

(6)Msg,MacA rthur to Under Sec.Army(William H.Draper),Jun 12 1948,FRUS,1948,Vol.VI the Far East and Australia,p.819;msg,CINCFE to DA,Nr.C-65590,20 Nov 1948,sub:strategy estimate,CCS File 383.21 Japan(3-13-45)sec.20,RG 218,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(7)“The Ryukyu Islands and their Significance,”August 6,1948,CIA Reports,p.3.https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000259203.pdf,2017年3月1日。

(8)“The Ryukyu Islands and their Significance,”August 6,1948,CIA Reports,p.2.https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000259203.pdf,https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000259203.pdf,2017年3月1日。

(1)从此,美国对日政策的重心,不再是非军事化、民主化,而是经济复兴。

(2)NSC 13/2文件第(5)条原文如下:“美国应该长期保持在冲绳的各种设施,以及在北纬29度以南的琉球群岛、南鸟岛、孀妇岩以南的南方诸岛上参谋长联席会议认为必要的各种设施。”参见:NSC 13/2,Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan,Oct.7 1948,With Separate Recommended Paragraph 5 Submitted on 26Oct.1948,FRUS,Vol.VI the Far East and Australia,pp.858-862.

(3)周建明、王成至主编《美国国家安全战略解密文献选编》(1945-1972),第2册,社会科学文献出版社2010年版,第729页。

(4)Frederick Lambert Shiels,“The American experience in Okinawa:a case study for foreign policy and decision-making theory,”p.301.

(5)徐天新、沈志华主编《冷战前期的大国关系:美苏争霸与亚洲大国的外交取向(1945-1972)》,世界知识出版社2011年版,第418-419页。

(6)NSC60/1,Japanese Peace treaty,September 8,1950,Documents of the National Security Council,University Publications of A-merica,Inc.1980,Reel 2.

(7)英文表述为Residual Sovereignty,该词还被翻译为“潜在主权”或“残存主权”。杜勒斯在1951年的对日和约大会上首次公开正式宣布日本拥有对琉球群岛的residual sovereignty,但是此词没有出现在旧金山对日和约文本中,美国后来在很多公开场合重复日本拥有对琉球的剩余主权。这种形式避免了直接吞并该岛而带来的棘手问题,但是却可以获得吞并所带来的各种权利,这在国际司法史上是史无前例的,被称为“司法怪物”。

(8)Memorandum by Dulles,June 27,1951,FRUS,1951,Vol.6,p.1152.

(1)具体内容为:“日本对于美国向联合国提出将北纬29度以南之南西诸岛(包括琉球群岛与大东群岛)、孀妇岩岛以南之南方诸岛(包括小笠原群岛、西之岛、硫磺列岛)及冲之鸟岛与南鸟岛置于联合国托管制度之下,而以美国为唯一管理当局之任何提议,将予同意。在提出此种建议,并对此种建议采取肯定措施以前,美国将有权对此等岛屿之领土及其居民,包括其领海,行使一切及任何行政、立法与司法权力。”详见《国际条约集》(1950-1952),世界知识出版社1959年版,第335-336页。

(2)奄美群岛位于琉球群岛的北部,对美国战略价值不大,因此美日1953年达成协议,1954年美国放弃奄美群岛施政权,日本将其编入鹿儿岛县。

(3)The Department of State Bulletin,January 2,1954,p.17.

(4)美国不仅用晴空政策表明了其维持现状的决心,而且调整了琉球的管理机构,并将调整后的机构固定下来。这种政策也表明了美国打算长期控制琉球的意愿。

(5)Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary,NSC 148,Annex,Staff Study on Basic U.S.Objective Toward Communist China,April 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.12,East Asia and the Pacific,p.294.

(6)Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary,NSC 148,April 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.12,East Asia and the Pacific,p.287.

(7)Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary,NSC 148,April 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.12,East Asia and the Pacific,p.288.

(8)NSC 166/1,United States Policy toward Communist China,November 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,p.279-280.

(1)NSC 166/1,United States Policy toward Communist China,November 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,p.293.

(2)NSC 166/1,United States Policy toward Communist China,November 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,p.281.

(3)NSC 166/1,United States Policy toward Communist China,November 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,pp.281-282.

(4)Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary,NSC 5429/2,August 20,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.12,East Asia and the Pacific,p.772.

(5)NSC 5429/5,Current U.S.Policy Toward the Far East,Annex,Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Current U.S.Policy in the Far East,December 22,1954,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.12,East Asia and the Pacific,p.1065.

(6)Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Souers)to the National Security Council,December 30,1949,FRUS,1949,Vol.7,pp.1218-1219.

(7)Arthur Radford,Chairman,JCS to General Twining re U.K.Proposal for Reexamination of Trade Controls with Communist China,June 24,1955,RG218,Chairman File,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(8)Memorandum of conversation,FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.19,China,p.591.

(9)NSC 5913/1,Statement of U.S.Policy in the Far East,FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.16,p.134-135.

(10)NSC 5913/1,Statement of U.S.Policy in the Far East,FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.16,p.138.

(1)在历史上,东南亚国家曾经被纳入中国封建王朝的藩属体系。艾森豪威尔政府认为,中国大陆与东南亚国家发展的不平衡最终将导致中国重新控制东南亚。这不仅威胁到美国在亚洲大陆的战略利益,而且还将破坏东西方的战略平衡。这是艾森豪威尔政府一贯的而看法。美国国家安全委员会在1953-1960年通过的NSC177、NSC5405、NSC5612/1、NSC5809、NSC6012等文件无不强调这一点。

(2)Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:Dwight D.Eisenhower,1954,pp.585-590.

(3)National Security Council Report,NSC 5516/1,U.S.Policy toward Japan,April 9,1955,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Japan Part 1,p.55.

(4)National Security Council Report,NSC 5516/1,U.S.Policy toward Japan,April 9,1955,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Japan Part 1,p.56.

(5)National Security Council Report,NSC 5516/1,U.S.Policy toward Japan,April 9,1955,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Japan Part 1,p.60.

(6)NSC 166/1,United States Policy toward Communist China,November 6,1953,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,p.299.

(7)The Secretary of State to Embassy in Japan,August 12,1954,FRUS,1952-1954,Vol.14,China and Japan,p.1703.

(8)John Foster Dulles,“Policy for Security and Peace,”Foreign Policy,April 1954,p.360.

(9)Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Robertson)to the Secretary of State,Washington,January 7,1957.FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,Document 106,pp.240-241.

(10)Memorandum of a Conversation,Department of State,Washington,May 15,1957,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,pp.289-290.

(1)Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McE lroy,May 1,1958,FRUS,1958-1960,Vol.18,Japan;Korea,p.31.

(2)该行政命令不仅确立了高级专员体系,而且还将美国琉球民政府与琉球政府的关系书面化、正式化,对琉球事务的重大方面作出了规定。参见Executive order 10713,June 5,1957,Box 5,Records of the U.S.Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands(US-CAR),RG 260 Records of United States Occupation Headquarters,World War II.National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(3)Memorandum of a Conversation,White House,Washington,June 19,1957,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,p.370.

(4)Memorandum of a Conversation,White House,Washington,June 19,1957,FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,p.371-373.

(5)Memorandum of a Conversation,Secretary Dulles'Office,Department of State,Washington,June 20,1957.FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,p.390-392.

(6)关于第一个要求,杜勒斯说他将准备进一步研究有限数量的小笠原群岛居民返回问题。参见Memorandum of a Conversation,Secretary Dulles'Office,Department of State,Washington,June 20,1957.FRUS,1955-1957,Vol.23,Part 1,Japan,pp.390-392.关于第二个问题,国务院和国防部研究之后决定维持原有规定,该规定仅允许在私人以及非政治场合使用日本国旗。国务院和国防部认为公开悬挂日本国旗将会时常提醒当地人冲绳回归日本是可能的,不利于他们接受现状,还会危害美日关系。参见:WH staff notes:DOS rejects Prime Minister Kishi's request to fly the Japanese flag in Okinawa;status of Soviet trade penetration;B-58 test program;new Egyptian radio to beam primarily at Arab world;U.S.-U.S.S.R.relations.Miscellaneous.WHITE HOUSE.SECRET.Issue Date:Jul 17,1957.Date Declassified:Aug 12,1988.http://galent.galegroup.Com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&lb=KE&loc_main&srchtp=basic&c=163&ste=4&txb=okiawa&sortType=RevC hron,2010年12月10日。

(7)其继承主要表现对中美敌对关系、阻止中国加入联合国、台湾问题、东南亚问题以及亚洲太平洋沿海岛屿链防卫体系的认识上。

(8)Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F.Kennedy,1961,p.23.

(9)Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F.Kennedy,1961,p.343.

(1)Special National Intelligence Estimate,SNIE 13-3-61,November 30,1961,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,Doc 80,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d80,2010年12月10日。

(2)The Under Secretary of State,“Rough Outline of Proposed Speech by President on China”,Nov 30,1961,Box 14,Papers of James C.Thompson,Jr,Far East 1961-1966,Communist China,Publications and Pamphlets,1955-Sino Soviet Conflict and 12/19/61,Draft,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(3)“微开门”更多的是一种长远计划,在实践中,“微开门”意味着中美关系弹性有所增加,美国方面会做出一些接触性尝试并更加重视中国的反应。

(4)“1962 Public Attitudes toward U.S.Policy on China”,undated,Box 15,Papers of James C.Thomson,Far East,1961-1966,Communist China,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(5)Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Counci,l“U.S.Policy toward Communist China”,November 30,1962,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,pp.325-332.

(6)From Mose Harvey to Mr.Rostow,“The Problem of Focus in our China Policy”,July 19,1963,Box 24,Papers of President Kennedy,National Security Files,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(7)From R.E.Dehor to Mr.Hilsman,“Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists”,July 30,1963,Roger Hilsman Papers,Cambodia-India,Sino-Indian Border Clash,1962,Implications Analysis,Box 1,Papers of President Kennedy,National Security Files,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(8)U.S.Contribution to APAG Meeting on Oct.7-10,1963,“The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability”,August 29,1963,General Records of the Department of State,Foreign Policy File,1963,From Pol 32-1 Territory&Boundary Disputes Violations,Incidents,Chicom-India 2/1/63 to Pol Chicom-U.S.2/1/63,Box 3863,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(9)Department of State,Policy Planning Counci,l“Notification of Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting,Tuesday,October 15,1963,10:00 am in the Secretary's Conference Room”,October 7,1963,Box 15,Papers of James C.Thomson,Far East,1961-1966,Communist China,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(10)From George C.Denney,Jr.to the Secretary,“Is Peiping Trying to Trigger World War III?”,July 22,1963,Box 24,Papers of President Kennedy,National Security Files,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(11)“Guidelines of United States Policy toward China”,November 15,1963,Box 15,Papers of James C.Thomson,Far East,1961-1966,Communist China,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(1)President Kennedy's Press Conference,November 14,1963,Box 15,Papers of James C.Thomson,Far East,1961-1966,Communist China,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(2)即“在维持对台湾人民承诺和抵制中共‘侵略'行为方面必须坚定,在准备迎接中共政权行为的重要改变方面必须灵活,在用客观分析取代陈词滥调和争论性话语方面必须冷静”。详见:Letter from Roger Hilsman to Adlai Stevenson,December 19,1963,Roger Hilsman Papers,Cambodia-India,Sino-Indian Border Clash,1962,Implications Analysis,Box 1,Papers of President Kennedy,National Security Files,John F.Kennedy Library,Boston,MA.

(3)From Ball to All Diplomatic Posts,December 14,1963,General Records of the Department of State,Foreign Policy File,1963,From Pol 32-1 Territory&Boundary Disputes Violations,Incidents,Chicom-India 2/1/63 to Pol Chicom-U.S.2/1/63,Box 3863,RG59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(4)将尚处于猜测和思考阶段的观点公开发表,必然是经过更高级的领导人物批准的。

(5)Dean Rusk,As I saw it,New York and London:Norton,1990.p.17.

(6)Memorandum of Conversation,June 21,1961,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,China;Korea;Japan,p.699.

(7)Memorandum of Conversation,June 21,1961,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,China;Korea;Japan,pp.699-700.

(8)Memorandum of Conversation,June 21,1961,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,China;Korea;Japan,p.700.

(1)National Security Action Memorandum no.68,August 11,1961,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,China;Korea;Japan,pp.702-703.

(2)Priscilla Clapp,“Okinawa Reversion:Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington,1966-1969,”International Relations,1974(2),p.10.

(3)其全称为Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on the Ryukyus.Report of Task Force Ryukyus,December 1961,Box81,Vice-Presidential Papers 1961-1963,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(4)The White House,Statement by the President,March 19,1962,Box 5,Records of the U.S.Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands(USCAR),RG 260 Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters,World War II,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(5)“Statement by the President upon Signing Order Relating to the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,”Mar.19,1962,John Kennedy,Public Papers of the President:John Kennedy,1962,pp.247-248.

(6)Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Harriman)to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs(Johnson),April 6,1962,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,China;Korea;Japan,pp.738-740.

(7)Guidelines of U.S.Policy toward Japan,Secret,Memorandum,November 17,1961,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00138,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=21,2010年12月10日。

(8)1963年2月28日,当参谋长联席会议向肯尼迪强调琉球对美国战略的重要性时,肯尼迪也表示他没有放弃该岛的打算。详见Editorial Note,FRUS,1961-1963,Vol.22,p.773.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d370,2010年12月10日。

(9)Nicholas Evan Sarantakes,Keystone:The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations,Texas:Texas A&M University Press,2000,p.117.

(10)Memorandum from James C.Thomson,Jr.,of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs(Bundy),August 21,1964,FRUS,1963-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,p.33.

(1)Priscilla Clapp,“Okinawa Reversion:Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington,1966-1969.”International Relations,1974(2),p.10.

(2)这些人员包括国务卿迪安·腊斯克、总统国家安全事务顾问麦克乔治·邦迪、国防部长罗伯特·麦克纳马拉、副国务卿乔治·鲍尔等。

(3)腊斯克对约翰逊的影响更大,约翰逊曾表示,他乐于倾听并接受腊斯克的对华政策观点。参见:Meeting with the Presidents on United Nations Matters,Nov.18,1964,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d66,2010年12月10日。

(4)From Consulate General Hong Kong to Department of State,“Communist China 1964 and Recommendations for U.S.Policy”,February 21,1964,General Records of the Department of State,Central Foreign Policy Files,1964-1966,Political&Defense,Box 2017,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(5)Memorandum of Conversation,January 22,1964,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.12,pp.671-672.

(6)Memorandum for the Record,September 15,1964,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,pp.94-95.

(7)The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:Lyndon B.Johnson,1964,Washington D.C.:Government Printing Office,1965,p.1357.

(8)Rosemary Foot,The Practice of Power:U.S.Relations with China since 1949,Clarendon Press,1995,pp.184-186.

(9)Memorandum from James C.Thomson.Jr.to Mr.Valent,i“Some Propositions on a China Strategy”,March 1,1966,Central Foreign Policy Files,1964-1966,Political&Defense,Box 2018,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(1)Conversation between Ryuji Takeuchi and William P.Bundy,“U.S.China Policy”,April 16,Central Foreign Policy Files,1964-1966,Political&Defense,Box 2018,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(2)Address of Senator George McG overn for Immediate Release,May 3,1966,Central Foreign Policy Files,1964-1966,Political&Defense,Box 2018,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(3)1966年12月1日,美国国家情报特别评估委员会提出,美国要正视目前“文革”的时机,采取更加现实的对华政策,防止中苏重温旧梦。参见:National Intelligence Estimate,December 1,1966,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,pp.479-489.1967年2月初,在白宫召开的中国问题咨询会议上,与会者广泛认同“‘文革'为美国最终走向与中国的和解提供了进一步的机会”。参见Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs(Bundy)to Secretary of State Rusk,March 29,1967,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,p.543.即使是一贯对中国持强硬态度的国务卿腊斯克,也认为应该在中国国内形势稍为平静后将华沙会谈提至外长级别。参见:Telegram from the Consulate General at Hongkong to the Department of State,February 19,1966,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,pp.256-259.约翰逊本人也表示自己正在反思美国政府的对华政策,并“欢迎小组任何成员在任何时候就华沙会谈或美国对华政策提出建议”。参见Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China,May 7,1966,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.30,pp.256-259.

(4)Ryukyu Islands,Confidential,Background Paper,January 7,1965,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00422.http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=63,2010年12月10日。

(5)Confidential,Aide-Memoire,January 7,1965,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00419,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=62,2010年12月10日。

(1)Text of Joint Communique between President and Lyndon B.Johnson and His Excellency Eisaku Sato,Prime Minister of Japan Following Talks in Washington,January 12 and 13,1965,Box 253,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(2)Visit of Prime Minister Sato January 11-14,1965,Background Paper,Japanese Security Situation,Box 250,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(3)Visit of Prime Minister Sato January 11-14,1965,Background Paper,Japanese Security Situation,Box 250,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(4)Visit of Prime Minister Sato January 11-14,1965,Background Paper,Japanese Political Situation,January 4,1965,Box 250,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(5)Recommended Policy Action on Japan,January 6,1965,Box 2625,Central Foreign Policy Files,1964-1966,Political and Defense,RG 59 General Records of the Department of State,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(6)Visit of Prime Minister Sato January 11-14,1965,Background Paper,Japanese Political Situation,January 4,1965,Box 250,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(7)Memorandum for the Record,Subject:White House Meeting with Prime Minister Sato,January 12,1965,Box 253,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(8)Text of Joint Communique between President and Lyndon B.Johnson and His Excellency Eisaku Sato,Prime Minister of Japan Following Talks in Washington,January 12 and 13,1965,Box 253,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(9)“Incoming Telegram Department of State,”February 24,1967,Box 251,NSF,Country Files,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(10)“Ryukyu Islands,Secret,Briefing Paper,”November 9,1967,Box 253,NSF,Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(11)“Memorandum for the Record,McN amara-Hasluck Conversation,”April 18,1966,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.27,Mainland Southeast Asia;Regional Affairs,pp.28-30.

(1)“Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McN amara,Future of the Ryukyu Islands(U),”December23,1965,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,pp.131-132.

(2)“Far East Interdepartmental Group,subject:Summary Highlight,Meeting of 25 May 1966,”Box 251,NSF Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(3)“Our Ryukyus Bases---Report of Ryukyus Working Group,Secret,Report,”September 1,1966,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00599,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=95,2010年12月10日。

(4)Johannes A.Binnendijk,“The Dynamics of Okinawa Reversion:Case Study of a Political Process,”Ph.D Dissertation from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,1972,p.325.

(5)Neal A.Marco,t“The Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process:A Case Study,Okinawa Reversion,”Ph.D Dissertation from Georgetown University Washington,D.C.May 1981,p.228.

(6)Reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins to Japan,Top Secret,Memorandum,June 14,1967,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00681,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=110,2010年12月10日。

(7)Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McN amara(JCSM-406-67),July 20,1967,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,pp.184-186.

(8)Reversion of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands Issue July 1967,Box 251,NSF Country File,Japan,President Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(9)Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant(Rostow)to President Johnson,November 3,1967,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,pp.217-221.

(1)Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McN amara(JCSM-376-67)June 29,1967,Box 252,NSF,Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(2)Priscilla Clapp,“Okinawa Reversion:Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington,1966-1969,”International Relations,1974(2),p.26.

(3)Neal A.Marco,t“The Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process:A Case Study,Okinawa Reversion,”Ph.D Dissertation from Georgetown University Washington,D.C.May 1981,p.231.作者在1979年10月7日在华盛顿对莫顿·霍尔柏林的采访。

(4)Reischauer,Edwin O.(AC 76-15),Interview#1,Oral Histories,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(5)Warren I.Cohen,Dean Rusk,Totwa,New Jersey:Cooper Square Publishers,1980,p.280.腊斯克在处理中美关系时,缩手缩脚,不敢越雷池一步,在很大程度上是害怕引起保守派的攻击,因为他在50年代曾遭到右翼势力麦卡锡主义的围攻。腊斯克作为杜鲁门政府中负责东亚事务的官员,首当其冲,承受来自共和党保守派的巨大压力。这段经历给腊斯克后来的政治生涯投下阴影,特别是使他在处理中国问题时如履薄冰。60年代初,腊斯克成为国务卿以后,一直牢记50年代的教训,在制定对华政策时,小心谨慎,不给共和党右翼留下发难的话柄。参见翟强:《越南战争和约翰逊对华政策》,《冷战国际史研究》2008年第4期。

(6)“Okinawa and the Bonins,Secret,Memorandum,”October 21,1967,Japan and the U.S.,1977-1992,JA00012,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=157,2010年12月10日。

(7)“Message from Professor Wakaizumi,Confidential,Memorandum for Record,”November 13,1967,Box 252,NSF,Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(8)“Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant(Rostow)to President Johnson,”November 3,1967,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,pp.217-221.

(9)Joint Communique Between President Lyndon B.Johnson and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan,For Immediate Release,November 15,1967,Box 253,NSF,Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(1)Joint Communique Between President Lyndon B.Johnson and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan,For Immediate Release,November 15,1967,Box 253,NSF,Country File,Japan,Lyndon B.Johnson Library,Austin,TX.

(2)Richard Nixon,“Asia after Vietnam”,Foreign Affairs,Vol.46,no.1(Oct.,1967),pp.111-125.这篇文章已经初现了尼克松主义的核心观点。

(3)尼克松认为:“在同美国在亚洲朋友的关系方面,美国应该着重强调两点:第一,我们将恪守我们的条约义务;第二,就内部的安全而言,在军事防务方面,除非存在某个核大国的威胁,美国将鼓励并有权期望逐渐由亚洲国家本身来处理,逐渐由亚洲国家本身负责。”详见赵学功:《巨大的转变:美国战后对东亚的政策》,天津人民出版社2002年版,第224页。

(4)尼克松主义三个原则:“(1)美国将信守它的一切条约义务;(2)如果一个核国家威胁同我们结盟的国家的自由,或者威胁一个我们认为它的生存对我们的安全以及整个地区的安全至关重要的国家的自由,我们将提供援助;(3)如果发生其他类型的侵略,我们将在接到请求时,提供适当的军事和经济援助。但是我们指望直接受到威胁的国家承担主要责任来提供其防务所需的人力。”赵学功:《巨大的转变:美国战后对东亚的政策》,第225页。

(5)Summary,FRUS,1969-1976,Volume E-13,Documents on China,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/summary,2010年12月10日。

(6)NSSM 14,U.S.China Policy,Feb.5,1969,FRUS,1969-1972,Vol.17,China,Doc.4,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d4,2010年12月10日。

(1)The Department of State Bulletin,May 12,1969,p.399;The Department of State Bulletin,April 14,1969,p.312.

(2)1969年2月,国务卿威廉姆·罗杰斯向尼克松建议在华沙会谈上提出一些对中国更有诱惑力的建议。但是罗杰斯在备忘录后附的两封文件显示了国务院顾虑重重。附件一强调中美关系正常化将给日本政府和美日关系带来重大冲击,附件二指出美国大幅调整对华政策将大大削弱台湾政府的国际地位。参见Memorandum from William P.Rogers for the Presiden,t“U.S.Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting”,undated,Central Foreign Policy Files,1967-1969,Political and Defense,Pol ChiCom-U.S.to Pol 1 ChiCom-U.S.Box 1973,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(3)关于“珍宝岛事件”事件,基辛格认为可能是苏联先动的手,尼克松对其看法表示认同。参见:Henry Kissinger,White House Years,Boston:Little Brown,1979,pp.172.

(4)中央情报局认为“目前苏联针对中国的军事部署已经远超应对边境冲突所需的水平”。参见Central Intelligence Agency,Office of National Estimates,“The Soviet Buildup against China:Dimensions and Implications”,May 6,1969,DNSA,CI01917.

(5)Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting,May 15,1969,FRUS,1969-1976,Vol.17,China,1969-1972,Document 13,pp.31-39.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d13,2010年12月10日。

(6)From Rogers to Consulate Hong Kong,Embassy London,Embassy Moscow,Embassy Dew Delhi,Embassy Paris,Embassy Rawalpindi,Embassy Rome and Embassy Tokyo,“Guidance for POLAD Discussion on August 26 of Sino-Soviet Border Incidents”,August 25,1969,Central Foreign Policy Files,1967-1969,Political and Defense,Pol 17 ChiCom-USSR to Pol 32-1 ChiCom-USSR,Box 1975,RG59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(7)Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)to President Nixon,September 29,1969,FRUS,1969-1972,Vol.17,p.102.

(8)8月2日,尼克松在访问罗马尼亚时向齐奥塞斯库(Nicolae Ceausescu)明确表达了他对中国的看法:美国不会介入中苏冲突或是参加任何试图孤立中国的集团,美国不承认中国不是因为中国的内部体制而是其对外政策。齐奥塞斯库告诉尼克松中华人民共和国没有威胁过其邻国,尼克松希望罗马尼亚在中美之间发挥斡旋的作用。参见Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and Ceausescu,Private Meeting Between President Nixon and Ceausescu,August 2,1969,FRUS,1969-1972,Vol.29,Doc.183,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d183,2010年12月10日。访问巴基斯坦时,尼克松向总统叶海亚·汗(Yahya Khan)指出“亚洲如果没有中国的参与不会向前发展”,“美国不会与苏联联手以孤立中国”,并希望他向周恩来转达这些信息,帮助打开中美接触的大门。参见:Memorandum of Conversation,August 28,1969,FRUS,1969-1972,Vol.17,Doc.28,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d28,2010年12月10日。

(9)From George C.Denney to the Secretary,“Communist China:Increased Curiosity About U.S.Asian Policy”,September 8,1969,Central Foreign Policy Files,1967-1969,Political and Defense,Pol ChiCom-U.S.to Pol 1 ChiCom-U.S.Box 1973,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(10)比如,允许美国游客和外国美侨大量购买原产地为中国大陆的商品,并将为国会成员、旅游者和教学人员三类人员自动提供去中国大陆旅游的护照。参见From Rogers to all Diplomatic Posts,“Change in Restrictions Relating to Communist China”,July 21,1969,Central Foreign Policy Files,1967-1969,Political and Defense,Pol ChiCom-U.S.to Pol 1 ChiCom-U.S.Box 1973,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(1)Summary,FRUS,1969-1976,Volume E-13,Documents on China,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/summary,2010年12月10日。

(2)From Embassy Rawalpindi to Department of State,“Chou En-lai Re Better Relations with USA”,October 14,1969,Central Foreign Policy Files,1967-1969,Political and Defense,Pol ChiCom-U.S.to Pol 1 ChiCom-U.S.Box 1973,RG 59,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(3)Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato and Your Meetings with Foreign Minister Aichi,November 18,Secret,Briefing Memorandum,November 18,1969,Executive Secretariat,Visit Files,1966-1970,Box 23,RG 59 General Records of the Department of State,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(4)Minutes of National Security Council Meeting,March 28,1969,Box TS 82,NSC Meetings,Jan-Mar 1969,Manuscript Division,Kissinger Papers,Library of Congress.

(5)楠田實《佐藤政權的二七九七日》,日本行政问题研究所1983年版,第58页。

(6)在这个协议下,美军保留在硫磺岛和马库斯岛上(Marcus即南鸟岛)的远距离无线电导航系统(Long Rang Navigation,Loran)基地,这是参谋长联席会议在小笠原群岛要求的唯一的军事设施。该协议并不是美国放弃琉球施政权的先例。详见:“Japan,Secret,History,”December 1968,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01024,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryN ame=cat&ItemN umber=283,2010年12月10日。

(7)“Okinawa(Part 3 of 5),Secret,Memorandum of Conversation,”September 9,1968,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU00996,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=267,2010年12月10日。

(8)美国军方对冲绳选举的态度是:在官方态度上美国必须对选举持疏远中立的姿态。美国认为:“这对于应对万一屋良胜出以及预防反对派指责美国的干涉是重要的。”与此同时,秘密支持西铭和冲绳自民党,但是必须小心谨慎。美国冲绳当局认为可以采取如下措施支持西铭:提高琉球人福利待遇,增加与日本认同的可信性,逐渐缩小基地活动减轻对公众影响程度。详见“Memorandum from the Under Secretary of the Army(McG iffert)to the Deputy Secretary of Defense(Vance),B-52 Sortie Rate,”June 14,1968,FRUS,1964-1968,Vol.29,Part 2,Japan,pp.289-292.

(9)Frank Langdon,“Strains in Current Japanese American Defense Cooperation,”Asian Survey,Vol.IX,no.9,September 1969,pp.715-716.

(1)Neal A.Marco,t“The Japanese Foreign Policymaking Process:A Case Study,Okinawa Reversion,”Ph.D Dissertation from Georgetown University Washington,D.C.May 1981,p.294

(2)“Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate(Kissinger)to President-Elect Nixon,Memorandum on a New NSC System,”December 27,1968,FRUS,1969-1976,Vol,2,Organization and Management of U.S.Foreign Policy,1969-1972,p.8.

(3)“Response to NSSM 9:Review of the International Situation as of January 20,1969,Volume V---Noncommunist Far East-Japan,Secret,Report,”January 20,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1977-1992,JA00036,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=296,2010年12月10日。

(4)“NSSM 5(National Security Study Memorandum 5)-Japan,Table of Contents and Part III:Okinawa Reversion(Secret),”http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/okinawa/oki3_a.htm,2010年12月10日。

(5)NSSM 5-Japan,Table of Contents and Part III:Okinawa Reversion(Secret),http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/okinawa/oki3_a.htm,2010年12月10日。

(6)“NSDM 13(National Security Decision Memorandum 13):Policy Toward Japan,Container 1,Chief of Military History/Historical Services Division,”Center of Military History(CMH),Background Files to the Study“History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,”1945-1978,RG 0319 Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(7)Aichi Visit and Okinawa,Secret,Cable,June 7,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01086,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayM ultiI tem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=343,2010年12月10日。

(8)Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,Subject:Nuclear as an Obstacle to the Reversion of the Ryukyu,Container 1,Chief of Military History/Historical Services Division,Center of Military History(CMH),Background Files to the Study“History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands”,1945-1978,RG 0319 Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(1)在为1967年峰会作准备时,佐藤就曾多次派若泉敬到华盛顿与美国高级官员就冲绳问题进行协商。佐藤这样做,一方面是为了渗透到美国决策层的心脏地带,从而准确了解美国各方在冲绳问题上的立场;另一方面是为了避免官僚政治带来的问题。若泉敬在1967年峰会上发挥了很大作用,所以佐藤想让他继续成为与美国接触的个人渠道。

(2)赫德里克·史密斯(Hedrick Smith)在《纽约时报》刊登了一篇文章,透漏了美国NSDM-13文件在冲绳问题的立场,声称美国准备撤出冲绳的核武。尼克松对此非常愤怒。1969年6月3日,白宫和国务院发言人否认了这一消息。详见:“Editorial Note,”FRUS,1969-1976,Vol.2,Organization and Management of U.S.Foreign Policy,1969-1972,pp.105-107;“Hedrick Smith's New York Times'[sic]Articles on Okinawa,Secret,Memorandum,”June 4,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01083,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=325,2010年12月10日。

(3)目前解密的美国外交档案显示,当涉及到核武器问题时美国官员都表示这个问题留到峰会由总统来解决。

(4)莫顿·霍尔珀林是约翰逊时期琉球工作小组的领导之一,也是最活跃的成员,尼克松上台后改组了国家安全委员会,他进入国家安全委员会直接负责冲绳问题。此时他已经从国家安全委员会委员会辞职。他在冲绳问题上对日本一直持同情态度,他与若泉敬也是好朋友。

(5)Wakaizumi Kei,The Best Course Available:A personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations,p.156.

(6)Wakaizumi Kei,The Best Course Available:A personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations,p.155.

(7)Kei Wakaizumi,The Best Course Available:A personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations,p.236.2009年12月22和23日,日本多家媒体连续报道了日美“冲绳核密约”原件被找到的新闻。日本前首相佐藤荣作的次子、前运输相佐藤信二22日证实,1969年日美首脑就美国向日本返还冲绳进行谈判时,两国领导人亲笔签署并交换了允许美军在紧急情况下向冲绳运进核武器的密约文件,该文件原件由佐藤遗属保管着。

(8)Visit of Foreign Minister Aichi,Secret,Memorandum,June 2,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01081,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=338,2010年12月10日。

(9)Okinawa Negotiations from American Embassy to Secretary of State,July 17,1969,Container 18,Chief of Military History/Historical Division,RG 0319,Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(1)Japan,Secret,Agenda,July 30,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01106,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiI tem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryN ame=cat&ItemN umber=374,2010年12月10日。

(2)Secretary's Call on Primin Sato,Secret,Cable,August 2,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01108,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayM ultiI tem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryN ame=cat&ItemN umber=376.

(3)OKNEG no.11---Communique and Unilateral Statement,Secret,Cable,September 1,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01112,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=379,2010年12月10日。

(4)东乡、下田、约翰逊、迈耶和斯奈德都曾作出这样的表示。详见Okinawa Negotiations,Secret,Cable,September 9,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01119,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=386;OKNEG no.11---Communique and Unilateral Statement,Secret,Cable,September 1,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01112,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=379,2010年12月10日。

(5)Okinawa Negotiations,Secret,Cable,September 9,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01119,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayMultiItem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsI D=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=386,2010年12月10日。

(6)General Wheeler Stresses Okinawa's Importance,October 9,1969,Container 18,Chief of Military History/Historical Division,RG0319,Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(7)Okinawa Reversion Negotiations,Top Secret,Cover Sheet,September 11,1969,Japan and the U.S.,1960-1976,JU01121,http://nsarchive.Chadwyck.com/quick/displayM ultiI tem.do?Multi=yes&ResultsID=12E3F1b0F59&queryType=quick&queryName=cat&ItemN umber=386,2010年12月10日。

(8)1969年9月3日,斯奈德作为“回归”谈判的美国首席谈判者,对谈判进程作了一个小时的介绍,参加者有国务院(包括负责东亚和太平洋事务的助理国务卿马歇尔·格林)、国防部和其他相关部门的代表。国防部的代表是杜林,陆军部的代表是锡耶纳等。在陆军看来,从斯奈德的讲述来看,会谈遵循的时间和设计是日本政府所希望的而不是美国的。军方认为迈耶强调令人满意的冲绳解决方式对于积极有效的美日关系是非常重要的,但是国防部的要求并没有像他们所认为的那样体现在谈判中。详见Memorandum Thru:Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations for Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,September 5,1969,Container 13,Chief of Military History/Historical Division,RG 0319,Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(9)Joint Communique between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato,Unclassified,Press Release,November 21,1969,October 9,1969,Container 8,Chief of Military History/Historical Division,RG 0319,Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(10)Address by the Honorable Eisaku Sato Prime Minister,November 21,1969,Box 23,Executive Secretariat,Visit Files,1966-1970,RG General Records of the Department of State,National Archives II,College Park,MD.

(11)Joint Communique between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato,Unclassified,Press Release,November 21,1969,October 9,1969,Container 8,Chief of Military History/Historical Division,RG 0319,Army Staff,National Archives II,College Park,MD.